Role played by Intermediary Institutions in Academiy-Industry Technology Alliances by Coeurderoy, Régis & Duplat, Valérie
UCL
Institut d’administration et de gestionUniversité catholique de Louvain
                                      
                                                RESEARCH REPORT   
                                                      
                                     
 
                                          
 




                                        
                                         
                                                                               
                                                                            Academic Year 2004-2005
                                         
                                         
Role played by Intermediary Institutions in  
Academy-Industry Technology Alliances 
 
The case of AGORIA, the Belgian Technology Industry Federation * 
 




                Due to the increasing complexity and pace of technological development, and the higher 
uncertainty and costs imposed by R&D projects, organizations have strong motives to collaborate 
through various modes of strategic alliances. When technology alliances simultaneously involve 
academy and industry organizations, the collaboration can be significantly complicated by the 
specific rules prevailing either in the academic environment or in the industrial environment. 
Academy-industry collaboration difficulties may arise for reasons of divergences in terms of 
motives, incentives, constraints, and organizational culture. Hence they need to be managed with 
specific organizational schemes.  
 
In the present paper, we propose to shed light on the role that intermediary institutions may play 
in academy-industry technology alliances. Indeed, when allying, academy and industry 
organizations can have recourse to intermediary institutions, which may help them deal with their 
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stringent and specific collaboration difficulties. We propose in this paper to focus on a specific 
type of intermediary institution; namely the industry federation. On the basis of an exploratory 
case study on the Belgian Technology Industry Federation, AGORIA, we expose the regulatory 
mechanisms implemented by this intermediary institution. This paper shows how intermediary 
institutions such as AGORIA may mitigate the collaboration difficulties and, therefore, ease the 





The worldwide increasing success for inter-organizational technology alliances is explained in 
big part by the today highly competitive landscape. Organizations have to deal with the current 
combination of “rapid-fire technological change, shorter product life-cycles, continual entrance 
of new players, and constantly evolving customer needs” (Santoro and Gopalakrishnan, 2001) 
and, therefore, need to collaborate more intensively. In such dynamic environments, the inter-
organizational collaborations enable to “share risks, to build on jointly shared capabilities, and 
to create synergies for better competitiveness (Cyr, 1999)” (Santoro and Gopalakrishnan, 2001). 
 
The inter-organizational collaborations may take multiple forms going from licensing to research 
joint ventures, and more and more commonly involve academy and industry organizations 
simultaneously3. Indeed, both academy and industry organizations have now strong motives to 
collaborate. While the current dynamic environment just described explains partly this new trend 
for academy-industry technology alliances, other motives are more specific to the academy-
                                                 
3 For a literature review of technology transfer mechanisms between academy and industry, read Phan and Siegel 
(2006). 
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industry rapprochement. There is, on the one hand, an increasing dependency of basic research on 
private funding (due to budgetary constraints) and, on the other hand, an increasing dependency 
of industry organizations on basic research (the evolution to R&D-outsourcing). Numerous 
businesses notably in biotechnology, new materials, media or ICT indeed rely on scientific 
knowledge.  
 
In response to this emerging interdependency between academy and industry organizations, 
academy organizations such as academic research centers, academic poles of excellence, and 
Superior Industrial Institutes (research report-ADE&MERIT, 20054) tend to adopt new structures 
(Gibbons et al., 1994) more “practically oriented, transdisciplinary, network-dominated, and 
flexible” (Tijssen and Korevaar, 1997), and they commercialize their knowledge more intensively 
through “patenting, licensing, research joint ventures, and startup companies” (Link, Scott, and 
Siegel, 2003; Phan and Siegel, 2006). While we do not focus in the present paper on the informal 
academy-industry relationships, it is important to point out that the exchange of ideas can be 
achieved through informal methods as well such as mobility of scientists and engineers (Pouder 
and St. John, 1996), social meetings, and ad-hoc conversations (Pouder and St. John, 1996). As 
pointed out by Santoro and Gopalakrishnan (2001), whether through formal and informal 
methods, academy and industry assets can be viewed as complementary. At the industry point of 
view, academy-industry relationships allow an “access to highly trained students and professors, 
access to new technologies, enhancement to the company’s image and reputation, proximity to 
economic resources, access to university facilities, and access to new technologies (Phillips, 
1991)”. At the academy point of view, they allow to “interact with industry in order to obtain 
                                                 
4 “Fonctionnement du système d’intermédiation scientifique et technologique en région wallonne”, study conducted 
by ADE (Louvain-la-Neuve) and MERIT (University of Maastricht).  
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additional research funding, gain access to industrial technical expertise, expose students and 
faculty to practical problems, obtain internships for students, and provide employment 
opportunities to university graduates (NSB , 1996; NSF, 1982)”.  
 
While academy organizations tend to initiate both short-term and long-term technology alliances 
with high tech companies, collaboration may present substantial specific difficulties. Indeed, 
academy and industry organizations are characterized by different “modes of interpretation, 
decision rules, and objectives, and specific communicative standards”, and have “different 
motives and incentives and operate in different organizational cultures” (Kaufmann and 
Tödtling, 2000). These divergent objectives and environments often result in conflicts between 
academy and industry organizations, and that at the three stages of contracting for technology 
(Pisano, 1989; Williamson, 1996; Oxley 1997, 1999; Hagedoorn, Cloodt and van Kranenburg, 
2005; Sampson, 2005): the ex ante specification of property rights, the ex post monitoring of the 
actual collaboration, and the ex post enforcement of the contractual terms. 
 
Kaufmann and Tödtling (2000) have explained that “linking firms to non-business systems 
stimulates innovativeness more than remaining within the business system’s set of routines … 
and improves the capability of firms to introduce more advanced innovations”. Moreover, 
“knowledge spillovers from universities to other organizations is especially rich since 
universities have less incentive to keep research secret than do industrial firms (Jaffe, 1989)” 
(Santoro and Gopalakrishnan, 2001). Given the strong contribution of academy-industry 
technology alliances in innovation’s stimulation (Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2000), academy-
industry collaborations deserve a special attention as well as the existing mechanisms that 
manage them. In this vein, this paper is aimed at shedding light on the collaboration difficulties 
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met between academy and industry organizations at the three stages of contracting for technology 
(specification/monitoring/enforcement) and at showing how mechanisms implemented by 




ACADEMY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES AND  
THE RISK OF KNOWLEDGE LEAKAGE 
 
Collaborations through technology alliance modes allow, among others, to share R&D costs and 
risks, to reduce uncertainty, to access complementary resources and skills, to achieve synergies 
leading to cost saving or improvements in R&D productivity, to technologically learn, to keep up 
with major technological developments, to improve the speed to market, and/or to achieve a 
critical mass in R&D (Caloghirou, Tsakanikas, and Vonortas, 2001). However, the management 
of technology alliances should remain cautious since it can expose valuable knowledge at risk of 
appropriation by the alliance partners5.   
 
It has been pointed out by scholars that three dimensions are particularly relevant when 
transferring knowledge through strategic alliances: the adequate ex ante specification of property 
rights, the ex post monitoring of the actual collaboration, and the ex post enforcement of 
contractual terms (Pisano, 1989; Williamson, 1996; Oxley 1997, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 2005; 
Sampson, 2005). The more problematic these dimensions, the more likely the knowledge leakage 
                                                 
5 This is specially the case in the absence of shared equity since equity sharing allows to align the partners’ 
motivation by creating mutual interests and so by reducing the possibility for opportunistic behavior by partners 
(Pisano, 1989).   
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- or so-called appropriability hazards (Teece, 1986; Pisano, 1989) - and the risks of conflicts in 
the collaboration. We intend to show in this section that in the case of academy-industry 
technology alliances, divergences in terms of rules prevailing in academic and industrial 
environments contribute to magnifying the difficulties with which property rights can be 
specified and effective monitoring and enforcement of partners’ actions can be achieved.  
 
The issue of property rights specification  
 
One of the key issues faced by the alliance partners is to define ex ante the future of collaborative 
outputs in a situation of high uncertainty. In contractual terms, it is often very difficult to set up 
ex ante the regime of property rights. Scholars have shown that, first, the nature of the knowledge 
transferred6 (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Polanyi, 1962; Oxley, 1997) - tacit know-how vs. 
codified technology - and, second, the scope of collaboration activities (Teece, 1986; Hennart, 
1988; Pisano, 1988; Oxley, 1997) - going from simple exploitation of the knowledge transferred 
by one partner to joint development of new knowledge by both partners - substantially impact the 
level of contractual complexity. The level of tacitness associated with the knowledge transferred , 
on the one hand, and the anticipation of creation of new knowledge or significant modification of 
the knowledge transferred, on the other hand, make difficult the ex ante specification of property 
rights (Oxley, 1997; Foss and Foss, 2006) and, therefore, limit the possibility to draft up complete 
contracts.  
 
                                                 
6 In order to understand why the nature of knowledge transferred may induce hazards, we need to recall the 
arguments of the literature on inter-firm knowledge transfers. Knowledge is considered as a complex mix of codified 
data and poorly defined tacit know-how (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). In the presence of tacit know-how, the 
transfer becomes difficult without intimate personal contact (Polanyi, 1962). 
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 Difficulties met at this contractual level can significantly be magnified in the case of academy-
industry technology alliances first due to the different nature of the knowledge developed by 
academy and industry organizations, and second due to the different approach adopted by 
academic and corporate organizations to publicize the produced knowledge.  
 
First, while the academy organizations ask for clear and rigid specification of property rights, 
industry organizations favor flexible specification of property rights. This is in big part due to the 
differences regarding the nature of research undertaken respectively in academy organizations 
and industry organizations. While academy organizations tend to focus on basic research (Tijssen 
and Korevaar, 1997), which is rigid, less flexible (Meyer-Krahmer, 1997; Kaufmann and 
Tödtling, 2000), and often too theoretical to be of immediate use (Tijssen and Korevaar, 1997), 
industry organizations have a more pronounced interest in applied short-term research 
(Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2000). Conflicts may therefore arise at the ex ante specification of 
property rights level since an agreement on specification of property rights which involves 
knowledge at both extreme phases of the research process - fundamental knowledge for academy 
organizations vs. ready to use knowledge for industry organizations - is difficult to reach. 
 
Second, the attitude towards the research, the disclosure of knowledge, and the reward systems 
differ significantly between the two types of organization. Academic researchers are recognized 
within the scientific community on the basis of their publications and their presentations at 
prestigious conferences (Dasgupta and David, 1992; Siegel, Waldmand, and Link, 1999; 
Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2000). Industry researchers will adhere to the profit-oriented business 
system and focus, therefore, on patents and commercially useful results (Dasgupta and David, 
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1992; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2000). In other words, academic researchers communicate via 
publications and industry researchers communicate via the price mechanism (Tijssen and 
Korevaar, 1997). At the ex ante specification of property rights level, it can be very difficult to 
manage the conflicting interests of making certain part of the produced knowledge public vs. 
restricting the access through patents or secrecy (Kaufmann and Tödling, 2000). 
 
The issue of collaboration monitoring 
 
As pointed out in the existing literature, contractual activities are another factor affecting the ease 
with which property rights are specified and partner’s actions are monitored. Contractual 
activities reflect the objectives pursued, which may vary from exploitation to creation of 
knowledge (Teece, 1986; Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1988). As previously mentioned, if the parties 
anticipate that their contractual activities will lead to the creation or a significant modification of 
knowledge, the delineation of property rights becomes problematic due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the outcome of such activities (Teece, 1986; Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1988). Beyond 
the ex ante specification of property rights (cfr supra), it makes the monitoring of partners’ 
activities much more complicated as well (Oxley, 1997). Recent research has shown that the 
success or failure of technological collaborations strongly depends on how partners’ actions are 
monitored (Brousseau and Coeurderoy, 2005). 
 
 
In the case of academy-industry technology alliances, monitoring knowledge creation and 
evolution is made even more difficult due to the distinct motives, ways of communication, and 
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modes of decision rules prevailing in the academic and industrial environments (Kaufmann 
and Tödtling, 2000).  
 
First, the communication codes and the information channels present specificities whether 
organizations belong to the academic or industrial environments (Monteverde, 1995). These 
specificities may strongly impede the effectiveness of academy-industry technology alliances. 
This is highly critical in the case of contractual activities going beyond simple exploitation of the 
transferred knowledge. As mentioned by Santoro and Gopalakrishan (2001), “first, effective 
communication helps articulate technology transfer objectives and expectations among partners 
(Lei, Slocum, and Pitts, 1997). Second, effective communication enables decision making in both 
organizations (the university research center and the industrial firm) to take place faster. If 
technology standards change, then the university research center and the industrial firm can 
refocus their efforts in order to respond to changes in the environment. Finally, effective 
communication reduces the manipulation of available information for political means (March 
and Simon, 1958). Effective communication allows collaborating parties to be more aware of 
expectations from the relationship thereby reducing uncertainty. Thus, there is greater 
confidence in each other’s capabilities resulting in more time being spent on technology-related 
activities and less time on personality-related issues”.  
 
Second, when there is a modification of the knowledge transferred or a creation of knowledge, it 
becomes particularly crucial to align the respective motives and to reach an agreement regarding 
the collaborative process implemented. Again, when the technology alliances involve 
simultaneously academy and industry organizations, conflicts may arise when trying to align the 
respective motives throughout the contractual duration. While both academy and industry 
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organizations produce and protect IP, academy organizations value IP not only as a revenue-
producing resource, but also as a tool in the advancement and dissemination of knowledge (Link, 
Scott and Brainard, 1999). In the academy environment7, rewards come from reputation and 
recognition, which require dissemination of findings, generate salary increases and teaching 
reduction, and favor mobility (Adams, Chiang, and Strakey, 2001). In the industry environment8, 
in contrast, rewards come from corporate profits, which require confidentiality. Hence, once 
collaboration process involves simultaneously academy and industry organizations, the academic 
research has to move towards secrecy, in conflict with standard academic practice.  
 
Finally, when decisions have to be made throughout the contractual duration, it is also argued that 
the high levels of bureaucracy and of inflexibility characterizing the way academy organizations 
(Siegel, Waldman, and Link, 2003) arrange collaborations may be harmful to the effectiveness of 
the technology alliances. 
 
The issue of enforcement of contractual terms 
 
Scholars have started exploring the institutional environments surrounding the transfer as another 
source of hazards (Henisz, 2000). Results of recent studies show that institutional hazards may 
cause difficulties at any of the three stages of contracting for technology (ex ante specification of 
property rights, ex post monitoring, or ex post enforcement) as well (Hagedoorn et al., 2005).  
                                                 
7 Other possible motives in the academy environment include “financial gain and a desire to secure additional 
funding for graduate assistants, post-doctoral fellows, and laboratory equipment/facilities. The norms, standards, 
and values of scientists reflect an organizational culture that values creativity, innovation, and especially, an 
individual’s contribution to advances in knowledge (basic research)” (Siegel, Waldman and Link, 2003).  
8 “Firms and entrepreneurs seek to commercialize university-based technologies for financial gain. They also wish 
to maintain proprietary control over these technologies, which can potentially be achieve via an exclusive worldwide 
license. The entrepreneurial organizational culture of most firms (especially startups) rewards timeliness, speed, and 
flexibility.” (Siegel, Waldman and Link, 2003).  
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 In the case of intellectual assets transfer, the “quality” of the institutional environment depends 
widely on the IP rights regime (Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Schleifer and Vishny, 1999) whose “strength” and “completeness” vary across countries and 
industries (Anand and Khanna, 2000). The “quality” of the institutional environment in terms of 
IP rights protection has commonly been assessed on the basis of the levels of IP rights 
measurement and enforcement achieved by public institutions (e.g., Ginarte and Park, 1997; 
Ostergard, 2000). Beyond the “quality” of regulation per se, the knowledge of rules by 
organizations has to be taken into account as well. As pointed out by Coeurderoy and Murray 
(2005), “a poor understanding of a different regulatory framework, even in an environment 
protective of individual rights, is likely to allow opportunistic moves by locally established agents 
who have a superior knowledge as incumbents”.  
 
 
The enforcement of contractual terms becomes even more delicate when academy and industry 
organizations are simultaneously involved given that they are ruled by institutions producing 
heterogeneous frameworks. Such a gap will yield to discrepancies and potential conflicts on the 
objectives of both parts as well as their respective behaviors.  
 
 
BENEFICIAL RECOURSE TO INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS IN THE CASE OF 
ACADEMY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCE 
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Considering the potential sources of discrepancy between academy and industry organizations at 
each contractual level (specification/monitoring/enforcement), it becomes clear that face to face 
relationships between academy and industry organizations are likely to experience significant 
transaction costs. Hence, exist intermediary institutions whose raison d’être is partly or fully to 
ease the management of collaborations between academic and industrial environments. While the 
intermediary role of those institutions is undeniable and determining in academy-industry 
relationships, it has remained rather unexplored in the existing literature; maybe because those 
institutions are not always at the forefront of the value creation process.  
 
In this section of the paper, we intend to show how beneficial it can be for academy and industry 
organizations to have recourse to intermediary institution when allying. To this end, we will first 
articulate our arguments on the basis of the existing related literature and, afterwards, we will 
illustrate our arguments with a specific type of intermediary institutions, namely AGORIA, the 
Belgian Technology Industry Federation.   
 
Mechanisms implemented by intermediary institutions  
 
The essence of intermediary institutions is both collective and voluntary (De Clercq and Dakhli, 
2003; Brousseau, Fares and Raynaud, 2004). One might consider them as forming an 
intermediary level between public institutions and inter-organizational alliances (Brousseau, 
Fares and Raynaud, 2004). Indeed, intermediary institutions are developed for two main reasons. 
The first is to respond to the high level of governance costs imposed by inter-organizational 
alliances. As organizations may share similar collaboration difficulties at any of the three stages 
of contracting for technology (specification of property rights, monitoring, and enforcement), 
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intermediary institutions may enable them to achieve economies of scale, scope and learning 
effects. The second reason is to respond to the high level of maladaptation costs resulting from 
the general and incomplete design of the public institutional framework9 (Brousseau and Fares, 
2000). Public institutions provide organizations with general solutions, which may not perfectly 
fit their specific coordination needs. 
  
Academy and industry organizations can have recourse to intermediary institutions in order to 
benefit from the regulatory mechanisms they may implement, and that at any of the three stages 
of contracting for technology. The recourse to private institutions may provide organizations with 
one or more regulatory mechanism(s) simultaneously and may require the organizations’ 
membership10 of their network. We present in this section the mechanisms that can be 
implemented in relation to the ex ante specification, ex post monitoring, and ex post enforcement 
difficulties developed supra.  
 
 
  ---------------------------- 





Mechanisms minimizing the ex ante specification problems  
 
                                                 
9 Resulting from political processes and evolutionary phenomena (North, 1990). 
10 As it is the case for AGORIA and SIRRIS, a collective industrial research and technological services center 
founded by AGORIA in 1949. 
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As presented supra, due to the different nature of the knowledge produced by academy and 
industry organizations and the different approach they adopt to publicize the produced 
intellectual outputs, the ex ante specification of property rights is complicated.  
 
 
The recourse to intermediary institutions may enable academy and industry organizations to 
benefit from information asymmetry reduction mechanisms, and so to reduce the costs of 
screening and selection of appropriate exchange partners a priori on the one hand, and the costs 
of negotiating and writing agreements on the other hand. 
 
Information asymmetry reduction mechanisms. First, the ex ante information asymmetry about 
the parties' true characteristics is magnified if belonging to distinct environments - academic and 
industrial environments- and, therefore, gives rise to significant screening and selection costs 
designed to identify appropriate exchange partners a priori.  Intermediary institutions can 
mitigate the ex ante information asymmetry and make the bridge between the academic and 
industrial environments thanks to two main channels: the "translation" of the intellectual assets 
produced in those two worlds and the information about the activities previously and/or currently 
undertaken by potential academy vs. industry partners. They enable academy and industry 
organizations to gather superior information on each other regarding identity, activities, resources 
and capabilities. One might, therefore, say that they allow a better match between partners 
belonging to academic and industrial environments respectively.  
 
Second, another important form of information asymmetry is the asymmetry about negotiating 
and writing an agreement. Intermediary institutions may enable organizations to benefit from 
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their own experience regarding those activities and, therefore, to reduce the possible gap between 
the ability of academy and industry organizations to manage design agreements.  
 
Mechanisms minimizing the ex post monitoring problems 
 
The recourse to intermediary institution may enable academy and industry organizations to 
benefit from coordination mechanisms and control mechanisms and, therefore, to reduce the 
costs of communicating new information, renegotiating agreements, coordinating activities, and 
controlling alliance partners’ performance.  
 
Coordination mechanisms. Intermediary institutions may ease the coordination thanks to the 
“roles, role relationship, conventions” (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti., 1997) they specify and 
dictate. Moreover, the intermediary institution’s events may help “diffuse norms and values by 
providing role models, setting standards, and exchanging information among participants 
(Jones, 1996)” (Jones et al., 1997)  
 
In the case of intermediary institution with membership11, the more frequent the exchanges 
within the network, the more structurally embedded the network’s members, and so the more 
widely they share values, norms, assumptions, and role understandings (Abrahamson and 
Fombrun, 1992; Reddy and Rao, 1990; Jones et al., 1997). This network’s culture enhances 
coordination among members and reduces its costs in three ways (Jones et al. [1997]):  
 
                                                 
11 As this is the case with AGORIA and SIRRIS 
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 “(1) by creating “convergence of expectations” through socialization so that members do not 
work at “cross purposes” (Williamson, 1991), (2) by allowing for idiosyncratic language to 
summarize complex routines and information (Williamson, 1975,1985) (3) by specifying “broad 
tacitly understood rules… for appropriate actions under unspecified contingencies” (Camerer 
and Vepsalainen , 1988).”(Jones et al. [1997]). 
 
Control mechanisms. A formal or informal control can be allowed by intermediary institutions 
and may help cope with the ex post information asymmetry relative to the task performance of 
the alliance’s partners. First, inspection of the activities of parties and their certification constitute 
a formal control mechanism that may be implemented by intermediary institutions. Second, in the 
case of intermediary institutions with membership, informal control is performed by the other 
members of the network. Indeed, when the private institution’s culture (i.e. set of norms, values, 
and practices) is diffused through its network, minority that does not conform to the culture is 
visible (Oliver, 1991).        
 
Mechanisms minimizing the ex post enforcement problems  
 
Considering the incompleteness of public institutions, intermediary institutions may enable 
academy and industry organizations to benefit from reputation mechanisms, collective sanction 
mechanisms, and arbitration mechanisms and, therefore, to reduce the costs of crafting 
necessary safeguards.  
 
Reputation mechanisms. Intermediary institutions may use the reputation mechanism to make the 
opportunism more costly (Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000). Indeed, reputation mechanisms rest 
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on the fact that once opportunistic behaviors are discovered, the information about these 
behaviors is rapidly spread around, and has the ability to significantly damage the current and 
future activities of the organization having misbehaved (Hirschmann, 1970; Blumberg, 2001). As 
a result, the reputation mechanisms discourage opportunism and reinforce safeguards.  
 
These mechanisms are particularly efficient in the case of intermediary institution with 
membership. Indeed, intermediary institutions have a higher ability to collect and convey 
information to publicize defaults under the rules (Hadfield, 2000) among their network. They can 
serve as a repository of players’ reputational information regarding, for instance, the debts unpaid 
or the low-quality goods delivered.  
  
Collective sanctions mechanisms. As defined by Jones et al. (1997), “collective sanctions involve 
group members punishing other members who violate group norms, values, or goals and range 
from gossip and rumors to ostracism (exclusion from the network for short periods or 
indefinitely) and sabotage”. Again, these mechanisms are more efficient in the case of 
intermediary institutions with membership. Collective sanctions mechanisms reinforce safeguards 
and discourage the opportunism as well since “they define and reinforce the parameters of 
acceptable behavior by demonstrating the consequence of violating norms and values” (Jones et 
al., 2007) 
 
Thanks to their collective sanctions mechanisms, intermediary institutions make the opportunistic 
behavior damage not only the specific alliance in which one behave opportunistically, but also 
the other current and potential alliances (Blumberg, 2001).  
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Arbitration mechanisms. Some intermediary institutions may provide organizations with 
arbitration mechanisms. Those mechanisms enjoy sources of efficiencies over the public courts 
(Richman, 2004; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; Hadfield, 2000), and that is particularly true in 
the case of innovative activities which require a certain expertise to be judged. First, judges are 
market participants more expert and specialized than public courts. Second, specialized rules are 
tailored to the idiosyncratic needs and transactional challenges of a particular field of activities. 
Third, specialized procedures are used to act more swiftly, at lower costs, and with more nuances 
than public courts. Fourth, arbitrator can consider information that could not be introduced in 
public court12. 
 
The arbitration mechanisms are structured under the public law of contract and arbitration 
(Hadfield, 2000). Indeed, the power of the intermediary institution to coerce organizations into 
respecting its legal regime and to enforce remedial orders arising from its private legal regime 
stems from contract law created and administered by the state13 (Hadfield, 2000). As a result, 
arbitration mechanisms may ease the safeguard against vulnerabilities.  
 
 
                                                 
12 “such as impressionistic evidence about business trends or judgments about the quality of items sold. They can 
base their decisions on a firm’s behavior over time, on probabilistic patterns that would not be admissible evidence 
in court. ” (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). 
13 “The state’s substantive involvement may be absolutely minimal, with no inquiry into the substantive or 
procedural attributes of an order. Alternatively, the state may take range of increasingly substantive roles: reviewing 
the extent to which the private legal entity has acted within a contractual or legislative grant of authority, adhered to 
its own procedural rules and/or reviewing the substantive approach taken in arriving at the order …. The range of 
possible legal mechanisms, therefore, allows for varying degrees of public law: from an absolute minimal public law 
component restricted to the registration of private legal judgments as publicly enforceable orders to a complete 
preemption of the field by public law. Within these extremes are regimes in which public law plays a role in 
structuring the private mechanism, such as by providing criminal penalties for fraud or perjury to promote the 
effectiveness of a private regime that relies on disclosures from self-interested parties, or by setting restrictions on 
the rules according to which contracting or disputing entities select a private regime, or establishing minimal 
conditions or broad principles which private legal rules must meet.” (Hadfield, 2000).  
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THE CASE OF AGORIA,  
THE BELGIAN TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY FEDERATION 
 
In this section, we propose to apply our arguments to a specific type of intermediary institution; 
namely the Belgian Technology Industry Federation, AGORIA. We intend to show on the basis 
of an exploratory case study which has been conducted on AGORIA how intermediary 
institutions may ease the management of academy-industry technology alliances, and that via the 
regulatory mechanisms they propose. The information regarding AGORIA, its structure, and its 
activities were mainly collected through a series of in-depth interviews with diverse 
representatives of AGORIA and SIRRIS - a De Groot Center-14.  
 
In order to briefly introduce the raison d’être of industry federations (trade associations) in 
general, we will refer to the view of Oliver (1990) regarding industry federations and more 
particularly regarding the determinants to the emergence of industry federations. According to 
Oliver, organizations decide to form industry federations for five main categories of reasons: 
first, to promote their interests in case of strong threats of government intervention; second, to 
facilitate the communication and information sharing through the publication of journals, 
magazines, newsletters, or through the organization of conventions and trade shows; third, to 
obtain selective (Olson, 1965) or economic advantages, such as information about less expensive 
sources of supplies, legal assistance, or statistical reports (Staber, 1987); fourth, to reduce the 
                                                 
14 We had the opportunity to explore our topic through multiple in-depth interviews: two interviews with Mr. PINTE 
(General Manager, Mechanical & Mechatronical Engineering Department, AGORIA), three interviews with Mr. 
WALSCHOT (Director of the legal department, AGORIA), one interview with Mr. CAMPIOLI (General Director of 
AGORIA Wallonia), one interview with Mr. BARALDI (Assistant Director of SIRRIS Wallonia, European Project), 
one interview with Mr. SALMON (Operational Director Wallonia, SIRRIS), and one interview with Mrs. WINDELS 
(information and technological watch – patent library, SIRRIS).  
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legislative uncertainty by disseminating information about political trends and requirements and 
to reduce the competitive uncertainty by providing members with standard definitions of products 
and product-quality guidelines or by disclosing the results of association-sponsored research 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); fifth, to assure legitimacy in the case of explicit institutional and 
public criticism.   
 
 
AGORIA and its structure 
 
AGORIA is the Belgian Technology Industry Federation that has been established in 1946 and 
corresponds to an association of Belgian firms. It represents organizations active in thirteen 
different technological sectors: aero spatial, industrial automation, automobile, contracting and 
maintenance, electro technique, mechanic and mechatronical engineering, metals and materials, 
assembling and crane, plastics, building products, security and defense, ICT, and metal 
transformation. Among the 1.400 members of AGORIA, 900 are Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises. 
 
AGORIA is composed of sectoral entities which are each dedicated to a specific and proper 
technological sector. Those entities represent the heart of the AGORIA’s activities. They directly 
provide members with information and/or concrete services specific to their technological sector. 
Moreover, AGORIA has developed central support departments - social department, economic 
department, legal department, and International Business Development department - that define 
the positions of the Industry Federation regarding the external world. Those latter departments 
offer their services and support to the sectoral entities of AGORIA but also directly to 
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members15. Finally, whilst AGORIA treats federal issues, three regional departments - AGORIA 
Wallonia, AGORIA Brussels, and AGORIA Flanders - are responsible for treating regional 
issues. The main purpose16 of AGORIA is, therefore, to develop resources for its members in 
social, economic, political, and technological areas, and to put them at their disposal or at the 
disposal of activities whose primary beneficiaries are its members.   
 
Furthermore, a collective industrial research center has been established by AGORIA in 1949 
under the De Groot law; SIRRIS. SIRRIS is a research and technological services center 
specialized in several areas of competence, such as engineering of materials17, mechatronical 
engineering18, technology and innovation in business processes19, processing technologies20, 
smart manufacturing and processes21, and rapid manufacturing22 for the sectors of metalworking, 
plastics, mechanical, electrical and electronic engineering, information and communication 
technologies and automotive23. SIRRIS puts at its 2.000 members’ disposal the know-how of 140 
                                                 
15 The amount of support services directly aimed at members is, however, much lower that the amount of services 
aimed at the sectoral entities of AGORIA.  
16 According to the statutes; the raison d’être of AGORIA is (1) to be fully in the service of its members and to use 
its influence to improve the economic, social, legal, and technological environment in which its members deploy 
their activities, to represent and defend the members and the sectors at the local, provincial, regional, comminatory, 
federal, European, and international levels; (2) to promote in permanent dialogue with the members their interests 
and to determine the collective stands; (3) to organize the collective actions and to offer individual services in 
response to the needs of members.  
According to the interior regulation whose objective is to guide and inspire the spirit and the working methods within 
the collectivity of members; at the sectoral level, and at economic, social, technical, fiscal, legal, environmental, and 
training levels, the federation will work on: (1) deepening and developing the links of professional solidarity and 
collaboration between its members, (2) undertaking collective actions and stimulating collective initiatives, (3) 
defending its positions and the interests of its members at the public level and at the European, federal, and regional 
interprofessional federations levels, at the joint commission level, at the consultative council, committees, or 
commissions levels, or other entities of dialogue (4) documenting, informing, advising, and assisting members at 
collective or individual levels, (5) intervening towards administrations, private or public organisms in favor with 
members. In order to achieve this mission, members will regularly transmit necessary information.       
17 Optimal use of materials in specific applications 
18 Design and optimization of mechatronical engineering  systems 
19 Optimization of product development and production organization 
20 Metal cutting, casting, surface treatments 
21 Intelligent processes development 
22 Rapid prototyping, tooling and manufacturing technologies development 
23 More than 80% of firms in those technological sectors are SMEs 
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collaborators, mostly skilled engineers and operators. Among the main SIRRIS missions, we can 
mention providing members with information about the most recent technological evolutions and 
their applicability24, proposing solutions to their daily technological problems, and accompanying 
them in introducing new technologies in products, services, and industrial processes. In order to 
achieve these missions, SIRRIS has built national and international networking activities and 
specific capabilities.  
 
In line with the structure of AGORIA and the federalized nature of research activities in Belgium, 
SIRRIS has adopted a federalized structure; namely SIRRIS Wallonia, SIRRIS Brussels, and 
SIRRIS Flanders. SIRRIS collaborates with universities, research centers, companies, 
associations and institutions in Belgium and Europe. While SIRRIS is historically anchored in the 
academic environment25, it tends to adopt a more industry-oriented than academy-oriented 
approach. SIRRIS plays a role of interface between academic and industrial environments.  
 
AGORIA and its services for Academy-Industry Technology Alliances  
 
Before describing the services proposed by AGORIA for academy-industry technology alliances 
and contributing to minimizing ex ante specification, ex post monitoring, and/or ex post 
                                                 
24 At this level, SIRRIS has been recognized since 2002 as a Center Patlib (Patent Library) on the European scene. 
“PATLIB stands for PATent LIBrary. The PATLIB centers were created to provide users with local access to patent 
information and related issues. The centers have qualified and experienced staffs who offer practical assistance on a 
variety of IPR. As the number of PATLIB centers has grown, the range of services has been expanded to include, for 
example, trademarks, designs, and copyright. Many of the centers have diversified still further to provide an even 
greater breadth and depth of services. The PATLIB network is made up of patent information centers located 
throughout Europe, currently about 300 centers. It was set up with the aim of improving communication and co-
operation between individual centers and promoting patent information awareness and the provision of services to 
the public.” (Website: www.epo.com).  
25 Moreover, SIRRIS shows specificities: in Liege, materials and applications, plastics and light metal substance; in 
Heverlee, sheet metal manufacture, flow study, production optimization; in Brussels, informatics and automation; in 
Diepenbeek, machining and surface treatment; in Gent, foundry.  
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enforcement problems, it is important to notice that the technological sub-sectors represented by 
AGORIA are very diverse in terms of innovation and inter-organizational collaborations. For 
instance, while the Belgian aero space sector initiates broad, pan-European, and highly intensive 
research projects, the Belgian ICT sector mostly develops research projects with Belgian 
universities through spin-offs. In this section, our intent is not to describe in an exhaustive way 
all services proposed by AGORIA in each technological sub-sector but rather to illustrate how 
AGORIA may ease the management of academy-industry technology alliances through some 
services it proposes.  
 
 
Services proposed by AGORIA to minimize the ex ante specification problems. The recourse 
to AGORIA services may enable academy and industry organizations to benefit from 
information asymmetry reduction mechanisms and, therefore, to reduce the costs of screening 
and selection of appropriate exchange partners a priori, and the costs of negotiating and writing 
agreements. It is at this first stage of contracting for technology that AGORIA and SIRRIS play 
the most important and determining role.   
 
First [reduced costs of screening and selection of appropriate exchange partners a priori], 
AGORIA has developed a deep knowledge about the academic and industrial environments at the 
national and international levels, and more particularly about the identity, activities, resources 
 23
and capabilities of academy and industry organizations respectively26. It can play a bridge role 
between those two environments; in other words, a role of “go between”. 
 
There is an acknowledgment of the gap between what is produced by the academy organizations 
and what will be used by industry organizations and of the fact that industry organizations do not 
let the academy organizations sufficiently know their needs.  
 
The main ex ante difficulties stem from the fact that, on the one hand, industrials think that 
academics are strong theorists and, on the other hand, the academics have a kind of complex “I 
am a theorist, I know things but they are not directly useful in industry”. AGORIA plays the role 
of interface, encourages them to meet one another, to learn about the intellectual outcomes 
produced in each environment - given the different nature of research undertaken, it may pose 
strong difficulties for industry organizations to understand the intellectual outputs produced by 
academy organizations, and vice versa -, and in the best case it will support them in the design of 
future collaboration.  
 
To this end, AGORIA and SIRRIS organize meetings and seminars intended to assemble 
organizations, to bring them closer, to inform them about new technologies, and to foster 
technological developments and sectorial initiatives in collaboration with academy organizations. 
For instance, regarding the mechatronical engineering sub-sector, 5 seminars are organized each 
year in order to introduce the last developments achieved by academic organizations and their 
application for industry organizations. As another example, the membership of AGORIA in the 
                                                 
26 Moreover, the knowledge that AGORIA has developed essentially about Belgian organizations can easily be 
complemented - if required - by the knowledge of its sister organizations in foreign countries about their own 
national members.  
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) allows its members to have access to the research 
results developed by the MIT, to offer a research position to some of their employees for a 
limited period at the MIT, and to invite American specialists as speakers on the occasion of 
seminars. We can also mention the “technological watch” information diffused among the 
members via a weekly electronic mail. The experts of AGORIA and SIRRIS assemble daily 
information about trends, evolutions, pilot applications, new developments and technologies and 
translate them in clear and concise articles. In addition to the AGORIA and SIRRIS experts, 
members themselves contribute to the “technological watch” by searching for new and interesting 
ideas potentially useful for themselves or for the other members and by publicizing them via 
TECHNILINE27 (a technologic innovation gate developed by SIRRIS and equipped with 
electronic mail). Finally, a last example is the “ILLICO PRESTO” data base, which has been 
developed by AGORIA and allows any research center and company to post its own research 
themes and/or to find more easily potential Belgian partners.  
 
One might, therefore, say that AGORIA plays an undeniable role in the “technological 
guidance”. It even goes further beyond the technological guidance since the research and know-
how developed by SIRRIS research center favor the “technological rupture” - essentially in three 
categories of technologies: rapid prototyping, thixo-molding of magnesium, nanopowders - , 
which is necessary for the long-term competitiveness of Belgian organizations. The main purpose 
of these “technological ruptures” is to favor and be at the root of formation of existing and/or new 
organizations clusters around those three key technological axes. Thanks to all those activities, 
                                                 
27 It assembles information relative to technologies applied to their members’ products and processes: technological 
watch, costs/benefits analysis on technological innovation implemented in firms, main trends prefiguring the 
tomorrow society, deep analysis about specific thematic. Access to TECHNILINE is free for members of SIRRIS 
and AGORIA.    
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AGORIA and SIRRIS are able to develop “road maps” intended to define what the different 
technological sub-sectors will need in the future, how they will develop and, therefore, what are 
the academic research needed.  
 
Second [reduced costs of negotiating and writing agreements], AGORIA benefits in a way from 
the experience of 1.400 companies in terms of negotiating and writing agreements. It provides its 
members with individual advices from lawyers and experts in case of specific legal problems, 
with information related to strong legislative modifications, and with templates of contract 
available in multiple languages (French, English and German) such as a template28 of licensing 
contract with European licensing partners and another template with non-European licensing 
partners. On the basis of these templates of contract, AGORIA may offer its support and 
expertise for the parties’ negotiations regarding for instance the royalty rates or indexes.  
 
In the specific case of academy-industry relationships, AGORIA can play its role of “go 
between” by encouraging industry organizations to visit academic research laboratories and/or by 
helping parties determine the types of contract they could negotiate and their respective 
contributions to the common projects. Indeed, AGORIA works on designing solutions regarding 
precisely the protection of the know-how and the implementation of the future know-how 
                                                 
28 Those templates - which apply to the transfer of technology for use outside and/or inside the European Union and 
can be used as a basis for drafting pure know-how or pure patent licensing agreements, as well as for mixed know-
how and patent licensing agreements - have been developed by ORGALIME; the European Engineering Industries 
Association defending the interests of the Mechatronical engineering, Electrical, Electronic, Metalworking and Metal 
Articles Industries. The objective of ORGALIME is three-fold: “(1) to be the prime voice of the EU engineering 
industry on selected issues affecting a broad range of its members; (2) to provide to its members information on the 
activities of the European Union and international bodies of direct relevance to the operations of reengineering 
companies operating in the EU, (3) to promote relations between member federations/associations.” (Website: 
www.orgalime.org).   
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developed throughout the collaboration, and that on the basis of typical basic clauses intended29 
to address the specific problems met with academy-industry collaboration. Those basic clauses 
will be elaborated and customized thereafter throughout the contractual negotiation. It is 
important to notice that contractual writing and negotiation functions differ widely with the 
research contexts, the facts, the reality of the project, the involved partners, and therefore this 
leads to very diverse contractual designs. The critical difficulty is often to distinguish the 
knowledge developed throughout the collaboration from the preliminary individual knowledge 
(individual background) which has been necessary to carry out the project.   
 
 
Services proposed by AGORIA to minimize the ex post monitoring problems. The recourse 
to AGORIA services may enable academy and industry organizations to benefit from 
coordination mechanisms and control mechanisms and, therefore, to reduce the costs of 
communicating new information, renegotiating agreements, coordinating activities, and 
controlling alliance partners’ performance.  
 
First [reduced costs of communicating new information, renegotiating agreements, and 
coordinating activities], AGORIA’s events and activities make its members share values, norms, 
role understandings, and common culture which may enhance and ease the coordination between 
members. In other words, it contributes to creating a convergence of expectations via 
                                                 
29 On the one hand, there are clauses relative to the use of know-how and protecting industry organizations in a way 
that they prevent academic scientists to publish anything in link with the project before industry organizations had 
the ability to protect the know-how via patents. Some clauses may also prevent academic scientists to use the reached 
results in a project dedicated to favoring research for competitors and/or in the same industry. On the other hand, 
there are clauses relative to the exploitation of know-how and guarantying that academic scientists can use what they 
have learned from the project for learning and training ends. Indeed, in some cases, scientists want to pursue research 
on the basis of the collaboration results.   
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socialization. This is allowed by their encouragement to attend congress, seminars (such as Isis-
Consult or Steel Business Briefing), training dedicated to managers of SMEs and continuous 
training in management, to receive publications and specialized magazines or the daily electronic 
information letter, to be involved in e-learning projects, etc.  
 
In the case of conflict between academy and industry organizations throughout the contractual 
duration, AGORIA can again play its role of “go between” in order to avoid severe and 
irremediable disputes. These conflicts can stem from divergences in terms of motives: whilst 
industrial organization focuses on what is marketable, academic organization focuses on what is 
scientifically innovating even if not marketable. Given those fundamental divergences, the 
project has sometimes to be put back on the rails.   
 
The role of “go between” is even more significant when AGORIA and/or SIRRIS are/is 
themselves/ itself involved as proper entity(ies) in the collective research projects that 
simultaneously involve academy and industry. In those cases, clusters of organizations are 
formed in which each organization will benefit from the common research development. This 
makes preliminary negotiation particularly difficult and mediation by intermediaries such as 
AGORIA or SIRRIS highly valued. As examples, we can mention the Plan Marshall or CRAFT 
European research projects30. In those cases, the partners may benefit from the experience of 
AGORIA and SIRRIS in terms of monitoring the ongoing collaboration. SIRRIS can 
                                                 
30 As first example, the Plan Marshall is an association between industry organizations of all size and from all 
regions, and academy organizations. This is a typical case where a mobilization is favored by third parties among 
academy and industry organizations of all size around specific themes. As second example, the CRAFT European 
research project are characterized by an operating mode relatively codified and straightforward thanks to the 
preliminary signature of the “consortium agreement” required by the European Commission and relative to a series 
of aspects, such as the exploitation of the results or the attitudes towards breaches. 
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accompany31 the collaboration in all the process from the conceptual project and technical 
feasibility analysis to final and tested prototype. Moreover, given its experience and quantitative 
techniques such as computer simulation of production line, SIRRIS has a high ability to detect 
the real causes in case of problems, to unveil the links between the causes, and to set up 
appropriate remedies. Being a center of excellence, SIRRIS is familiarized with challenges and 
daily problems in the technological industry and can, therefore, support academy-industry 
collaborations thanks to its specific solutions and its research practically oriented.    
 
Another particularly successful initiative of AGORIA dedicated to bridging the gap between 
academic know-how and the implementation thereof in industrial applications, is the founding of 
the FMTC (Flanders’ Mechatronics Technology Center)32. The FMTC is a center of excellence in 
mechatronics supported partly by the Flemish government and by 17 leading mechatronic 
companies in Flanders. This technology center is characterized by a rather unique business model 
of joint research projects and performs three types of projects: strategic basic research projects33, 
collective research projects34, and contract research projects35. This research center has for main 
                                                 
31 More specifically for metal components in synthetic and composite materials, for metallic constructions, 
structures, machines, or complete products composed of mechanic and electro mechanic sub-systems.   
32 At the end of  2006, FMTC employed 16 full time highly educated-engineers, and 4 Ph.D researchers at the 
department of mechanical engineering, Univesity of Leuven, and had a membership of 17 member companies: Atlas 
Copco, Barco, Bekaert, CNH, Daikin, Dana, EADS, Gilbos, Hansen Transmissions, Alliance International (IPSO), 
LVD, Packo, Pattyn  Packing Lines, Picanol, Teleservice Systems, Televic and Van De Wiele. “The major share of 
FMTC activities in 2006 consisted of 19 research projects classified in three industry-driven research programs; 
machine servitisation, modular machines and high productivity machine”. (Website: www.fmtc.be).  
33 “These aim at the realization of scientific and technological breakthroughs that will form the basis for new 
products for the mechatronic industry in Flanders. The projects ware followed up by at least three of FMTC’s 
member companies. The information from these projects is directly available for all members of FMTC, while the 
dissemination of the information to the broader mechatronic sector in Flanders occurs with a time-delay”.  
(Website: www.fmtc.be) 
34 “These target the clustering and translation of academic know-how into innovative applications that can be used 
by several of the participating companies. At least three member companies need to be interested in a particular 
topic before the project is initiated. Participation in collective research projects is open to non-member companies if 
they provide added value to the project. By sharing the cost of collective research projects, the investment of the 
individual companies can be greatly reduced. Information from these projects is immediately available to the 
participating partners, while the other members of FMTC can obtain the information at the end of the project. The 
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objective to efficiently monitor the academy-industry collaborations in the mechatronical 
engineering industry. To this end, the FMTC is simultaneously industry-oriented (being partly 
financed by the 17 companies themselves, the activities of the FMTC are essentially driven by 
the effective needs of those companies in terms of research) and academic-oriented (the research 
projects involve in most cases PhD students and academic departments). The FMTC is an 
initiative guarantying a permanent and direct bridge between academic and industrial 
environments and offering a strong framework for monitoring the ongoing collaboration.     
 
Second [reduced costs of controlling alliance partners’ performance], SIRRIS has developed a 
wide park of measuring and test equipment and is accredited36 by BELAC37 (Belgian 
Accreditation Structure) for some tests and measures. This allows a control and certification for 
the outputs of its members. This control is crucial since given the current trend for harmonization, 
all products and services have to be approved nationally and/or internationally. Moreover, 
SIRRIS possesses the Q*For quality label38 for all its services such as training and consulting.  
                                                                                                                                                              
dissemination of the information to the broader mechatronic sector in Flanders occurs with a time-delay.”  
(Website: www.fmtc.be) 
35 “These are specific projects for individual companies. These projects comprise both industry-oriented research, 
where a specific problem is analyzed, and prototype research, where FMTC uses its general technological 
knowledge to generate a specific prototype. Contract research projects are only conducted in FMTC fields of 
expertise on topics that are non-competitive with members activities.” (Website: www.fmtc.be) 
36 “Economic structures are subject to a dynamic evolution forced by internationalization of trade. Confidence in 
conformity of products and services to stated specifications is of primary importance to eliminate technical barriers, 
to allow for competition and to achieve harmonization in trade agreement. In such a framework, it is essential to 
boost confidence of both the economic actors as well as of the authorities in charge of market control with regard to 
documents issued by conformity assessment bodies (laboratories, inspection and certification bodies). These 
documents need to be regarded as reliable technical passports for a product or a service.” 
(Website:http://economie.fgov.be/orgnization_market/belac).  
37 The BELAC “is established according to legal stipulations and placed under the responsibility of the Federal 
Public Service Economy, SMEs, Self Employed and Energy. The royal decree of the 31st of January 2006 creating 
the BELAC system for accreditation of conformity assessment bodies has come into force on the 1st of August 2006. 
Because of this, the former accreditation bodies BKO, BELTEST and BELCERT cease to exist and BELAC has 
become the sole accreditation system in Belgium.” (Website: http://economie.fgov.be/organization.market/belac).  
38 SIRRIS benefits from the Q*For Training and Q*For Consulting labels (Website: www.qfor.net). “The Q*For 
methodology has been developed under the framework of the Leonardo da Vinci Programme. The Q*For Network 
contains basic information about Training Organizations from Belgium, Spain, and Czech Republic that have been 
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 Beyond the technical control of activities and outputs by an intermediary institution such as 
SIRRIS, the control can be relative to the respect of established and fixed budget by involved 
parties. This latter financial control usually implies regular reports showing whether expenses 
exceed the established budget. In some cases, this control is performed by third parties39.   
 
 
Services proposed by AGORIA to minimize the ex post enforcement problems. The recourse 
to AGORIA services may enable academy and industry organizations to benefit from reputation 
mechanisms and collective sanctions mechanisms and, therefore, to reduce the costs of crafting 
necessary safeguards.  
 
First [reduced costs of crafting necessary safeguards], even if AGORIA and SIRRIS may not 
force an organization to opt for one or another partner, reputation mechanisms play a crucial role 
in academy-industry collaboration and are present at any time. The damage of ruined reputation 
by previous opportunistic behavior is particularly critical when the organization is of small size 
since it relies a priori even more on the network of AGORIA to make business and find potential 
partners. Indeed, opportunistic behavior can be easily detected by the industry federation and/or 
its members and the information regarding this behavior will be informally diffused through the 
network as a damaging signal. In a way, AGORIA plays a role of witness and may on this basis 
recommend one or another partner.   
                                                                                                                                                              
evaluated and meet the following conditions: more than 80% of their clients are satisfied or very satisfied with the 
company, have show an adequate level of consistency in management skills, and have shown a good level of 
professionalism.”   
39 This control is in general performed by an auditing company.  
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 Second [reduced costs of crafting necessary safeguards], while formal collective sanctions are 
not really applied40, informal sanctions can threaten the academy or industry organizations 
having misbehaved. Among the main informal collective sanctions, there are the avoidance by 
AGORIA and SIRRIS of recommending the organizations having misbehaved as potential 
reliable partners and the avoidance by members of involving them in future collaborations. 
However, in the case of collective research project with coordinator or management committee 
such as European research project41, formal sanctions may arise through the revocation of the 
academy or industry organizations having misbehaved (i.e., predefined obligations are not 
fulfilled by the organizations) from the ongoing research project and the replacement by another 
organization.   
---------------------------- 






In the present paper, our purpose was to shed light on the role of facilitator that intermediary 
institutions such as AGORIA - the Belgian Technology Industry Federation- may play in 
academy-industry technology alliances. We have shown that academy-industry collaborations 
have to deal with stringent difficulties arising from their divergences in terms of motives, 
                                                 
40 We can, however, mention the existence of formal sanctions in the statutes which regulate the relationship 
between AGORIA and its members; namely the exclusion from the industry federation. Can be excluded from the 
industry union, any organization that is responsible for a serious breach of its duties as member of the industry 
federation or that fails in laws of honor and probity.  
41 The sanction is even heavier in the case of European research project since the organizations having misbehaved 
must reimburse the money that they received in advance and sometimes complements.  
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incentives, constraints, and organizational culture. Those difficulties can appear at each stage of 
contracting for technology - ex ante specification of property rights, ex post monitoring of the 
actual collaboration, and ex post enforcement of the contractual terms- and significantly magnify 
the risks of conflicts in the academy-industry collaboration. It becomes clear that face to face 
relationships between academy and industry organizations are likely to experience significant 
transaction costs.  
 
At each contractual stage, we exposed the regulatory mechanisms potentially proposed by 
institutional intermediaries that can help to deal with the stringent difficulties met throughout the 
academy-industry collaborations. To this end, we proposed, first, a theoretical typology of 
regulatory mechanisms potentially provided by intermediary institutions - information asymmetry 
reduction mechanisms, coordination mechanisms, control mechanisms, reputation mechanisms, 
collective sanctions mechanisms, arbitration mechanisms - and, second, we developed the way 
those mechanisms contribute to mitigating the collaboration difficulties of academy-industry 
technology alliance. Finally, we illustrated our arguments via an exploratory case study on a 
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REASONS FOR THESE 



















Ex-ante specification  
   
1. costs of screening and 
selection of appropriate 
exchange partners a priori are 
increased  
 
I.I. may make the bridge between the 
academic and industrial 
environments via two channels: (1) 
“translation” of the intellectual assets 
produced in the two environments 
and (2) information about the 
= 
symmetry reduction 
activities previously and/or currently 
undertaken by potential future 
partners in the two environments 
information a
mechanisms 
2. costs of negotiating and 
writing the contractual 
agreement are increased  
 
- different nature of the 
knowledge produced by 





 different approach adopted 
y academy and industry 
organizations to publicize the 
produced knowledge 
I.I. may enable organizations to 
benefit from its own experience 
regarding negotiation and writing of 
academy-industry technology 












 Ex-post monitoring (particularly if beyond simple exploitation of the transferred knowledge) 
 
1.  costs of communicating new 
information, renegotiating 
contractual agreement,  and 
coordinating activities are 
increased   
I.I. may ease the coordination thanks 
to the roles, role relationships, 
conventions it specifies and dictates, 
and thanks to the events it organizes 
to help diffuse norms and values =  
coordination mechanisms 
2. costs of controlling the 
partners’ performance are 
increased  
 
-  distinct motives (diffusion 
vs. protection), ways of 
communication, and modes of 
decision rules prevailing in the 
academic and industrial 
environments    I.I. may inspect activities of partners 
(formal)/ other members of I.I. may 
detect those that do not conform the 













Ex-post enforcement  
 
I.I. may use reputation mechanisms 
I.I. may use collective sanctions 
mechanisms 
1. costs of crafting necessary 
safeguards are increased 
 
- heterogeneous framework 
produced by the institutions 
which rule respectively 
academy and industry 
organizations  

























INSTITUTIONS  (I.I.) 






Ex-ante specification  














1. costs of screening 
and selection of 
appropriate 
exchange partners a 
priori are increased  
 
I.I. may make the bridge between 
the academic and industrial 
environments via two channels: (1) 
“translation” of the intellectual 
assets produced in the two 
environments and (2) information 
about the activities previously 
and/or currently undertaken by 
potential future partners in the two 
environments = information 
asymmetry reduction 
mechanisms 
(1) AGORIA plays the role of interface 
between the academy and industry 
organizations and  encourages them to meet 
one another, to learn about the intellectual 
outcomes produced in each environment 
(e.g., membership of AGORIA in the MIT, 
technological watch of TECHNILINE, 
ILLICO PRESTO data base) 
(2) AGORIA has developed a deep 
knowledge about the academic and 
industrial environments at the national and 










 resources and capabilities of academy and 
industry organizations 
  Ex-post enforcement  






I.I. may enable organizations to 
benefit from its own experience 
regarding negotiation and writing 
of academy-industry technology 
alliances = information 
asymmetry reduction 
mechanisms 
AGORIA makes its members benefit from 
the experience of its lawyers and experts in 
terms of academy-industry contractual 
dimensions: individual advices,  templates 
of contract, typical clauses regarding the 
protection of the know-how and the 
implementation of the future know-how 








 Ex-post monitoring (particularly if beyond simple exploitation of the transferred knowledge) 
 





agreement,  and 
coordinating 
activities are 
increased   
I.I. may ease the coordination 
thanks to the roles, role 
relationships, conventions it 
specifies and dictates, and thanks 
to the events it organizes to help 
diffuse norms and values =  
coordination mechanisms 
AGORIA creates a convergence of 
expectations, norms, values, role 
understandings and culture via socialization 
(e.g., congress, seminars, training, 
publications)  
 
AGORIA plays a critical role of “go 
between” if involved in the monitoring of 
ongoing collective research project such as 
CRAFT projects, FMTC  
 





I.I. may inspect activities of 
partners (formal)/ other members 
of I.I. may detect those that do not 
conform the I.I. culture (informal) 
= control mechanisms 
SIRRIS inspects the activities via a wide 
park of measuring and test equipment (it is 
accredited by BELAC and it possesses the 





































 I.I. may use reputation 
mechanisms  
AGORIA and its members can easily detect 
opportunistic behaviors adopted by one or 
another member and diffuse rapidly the 
information about these behaviors through 



















Application to AGORIA  
 
I.I. may use collective sanctions 
mechanisms 
AGORIA can avoid recommending an 
academy or industry organization having 
adopted an opportunistic behavior (informal 
sanctions) 
 
AGORIA can exclude members from the 
industry federation and/or from the 
collective research project (formal 
sanctions) 
 
1. costs of crafting 
necessary safeguards 
are increased 
I.I. may implement arbitration 
mechanisms 
Not applicable in the case of AGORIA 
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